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William Paley Institute
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Intelligent Design™ |
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Paley's Formulation of the Teleological Argument
Excerpts from William Paley's Natural Theology, published in 1800.
CHAPTER ONE: "STATE OF THE ARGUMENT"
In crossing a heath, suppose I pitched my foot against a stone and
were asked
how the stone came to be there, I might possibly answer that for
anything I knew
to the contrary it had lain there forever; nor would it, perhaps, be
very easy
to show the absurdity of this answer. But suppose I had found a
watch upon the
ground, and it should be inquired how the watch happened to be in
that place, I
should hardly think of the answer which I had before given, that for
anything I
knew the watch might have always been there. Yet why should not this
answer
serve for the watch as well as for the stone? Why is it not as
admissible in the
second case as in the first? For this reason, and for no other,
namely, that
when we come to inspect the watch, we perceive -- what we could not
discover in
the stone -- that its several parts are framed and put together for
a purpose,
e.g., that they are so formed and adjusted as to produce motion, and
that motion
so regulated as to point out the hour of the day; that if the
different parts
had been differently shaped from what they are, of a different size
from what
they are, or placed after any other manner or in any other order
than that in
which they are placed, either no motion at all would have been
carried on in the
machine, or none which would have answered the use that is now
served by it. To
reckon up a few of the plainest of these parts and of their offices,
all tending
to one result; we see a cylindrical box containing a coiled elastic
spring,
which, by its endeavor to relax itself, turns round the box. We next
observe a
flexible chain -- artificially wrought for the sake of flexure --
communicating
the action of the spring from the box to the fusee. We then find a
series of
wheels, the teeth of which catch in and apply to each other,
conducting the
motion from the fusee to the balance and from the balance to the
pointer, and at
the same time, by the size and shape of those wheels, so regulating
that motion
as to terminate in causing an index, by an equable and measured
progression, to
pass over a given space in a given time. We take notice that the
wheels are made
of brass, in order to keep them from rust; the springs of steel, no
other metal
being so elastic; that over the face of the watch there is placed a
glass, a
material employed in no other part of the work, but in the room of
which, if
there had been any other than a transparent substance, the hour
could not be
seen without opening the case. This mechanism being observed -- it
requires
indeed an examination of the instrument, and perhaps some previous
knowledge of
the subject, to perceive and understand it; but being once, as we
have said,
observed and understood -- the inference we think is inevitable,
that the watch
must have had a maker-that there must have existed, at some time and
at some
place or other, an artificer or artificers who formed it for the
purpose which
we find it actually to answer, who comprehended its construction and
designed
its use.
I. Nor would it, I apprehend, weaken the conclusion, that we had
never seen a
watch made -- that we had never known an artist capable of making
one -- that we
were altogether incapable of executing such a piece of workmanship
ourselves, or
of understanding in what manner it was performed; all this being no
more than
what is true of some exquisite remains of ancient art, of some lost
arts, and,
to the generality of mankind, of the more curious productions of
modern
manufacture. Does one man in a million know how oval frames are
turned?
Ignorance of this kind exalts our opinion of the unseen and unknown
artist's
skiff, if he be unseen and unknown, but raises no doubt in our minds
of the
existence and agency of such an artist, at some former time and in
some place or
other. Nor can I perceive that it varies at all the inference,
whether the
question arise concerning a human agent or concerning an agent of a
different
species, or an agent possessing in some respects a different nature.
II. Neither, secondly, would it invalidate our conclusion, that the
watch
sometimes went wrong or that it seldom went exactly right. The
purpose of the
machinery, the design, and the designer might be evident, and in the
case
supposed, would be evident, in whatever way we accounted for the
irregularity of
the movement, or whether we could account for it or not. It is not
necessary
that a machine be perfect in order to show with what design it was
made: still
less necessary, where the only question is whether it were made with
any de-
sign at all.
III. Nor, thirdly, would it bring any uncertainty into the argument,
if there
were a few parts of the watch,, concerning which we could not
discover or had
not yet discovered in what manner they conduced to the general
effect; or even
some parts, concerning which we could not ascertain whether they
conduced to
that effect in any manner whatever. For, as to the first branch of
the case, if
by the loss, or disorder, or decay of the parts in question, the
movement of the
watch were found in fact to be stopped, or disturbed, or retarded,
no doubt
would remain in our minds as to the utility or intention of these
parts,
although we should be unable to investigate the manner according to
which, or
the connection by which, the ultimate effect depended upon their
action or
assistance; and the more complex is the machine, the more likely is
this
obscurity to arise. Then, as to the second thing supposed, namely,
that there
were parts which might be spared without prejudice to the movement
of the watch,
and that we had proved this by experiment, these superfluous parts,
even if we
were completely assured that they were such, would not vacate the
reasoning
which we had instituted concerning other parts. The indication of
contrivance
remained, with respect to them, nearly as it was before.
IV. Nor, fourthly, would any man in his senses think the existence
of the watch
with its various machinery accounted for, by being told that it was
one out of
possible combinations of material forms; that whatever he had found
in the place
where he found the watch, must have contained some internal
configuration or
other; and that this configuration might be the structure now
exhibited, namely,
of the works of a watch, as well as a different structure.
V. Nor, fifthly, would it yield his inquiry more satisfaction, to be
answered
that there existed in things a principle of order, which had
disposed the parts
of the watch into their present form and situation. He never knew a
watch made
by the principle of order; nor can he even form to himself an idea
of what is
meant by a principle of order distinct from the intelligence of the
watchmaker.
VI. Sixthly, he would be surprised to hear that the mechanism of the
watch was
no proof of contrivance, only a motive to induce the mind to think
so:
VII. And not less surprised to be informed that the watch in his
hand was
nothing more than the result of the laws of metallic nature. It is a
perversion
of language to assign any law as the efficient, operative cause of
any thing. A
law presupposes an agent, for it is only the mode according to which
an agent
proceeds: it implies a power, for it is the order according to which
that power
acts. Without this agent, without this power, which are both
distinct from
itself, the law does nothing, is nothing. The expression, "the law
of metallic
nature," may sound strange and harsh to a philosophic ear; but it
seems quite as
justifiable as some others which are more familiar to him, such as
"the law of
vegetable nature," "the law of animal nature," or, indeed, as "the
law of
nature" in general, when assigned as the cause of phenomena, in
exclusion of
agency and power, or when it is substituted into the place of these.
VIII. Neither, lastly, would our observer be driven out of his
conclusion or
from his confidence in its truth by being told that he knew nothing
at all about
the matter. He knows enough for his argument; he knows the utility
of the end;
he knows the subserviency and adaptation of the means to the end.
These points
being known, his ignorance of other points, his doubts concerning
other points
affect not the certainty of his reasoning. The consciousness of
knowing little
need not beget a distrust of that which he does know.
CHAPTER TWO: "STATE OF THE ARGUMENT CONTINUED"
Suppose, in the next place, that the person who found the watch
should after
some time discover that, in addition to all the properties which he
had hitherto
observed in it, it possessed the unexpected property of producing in
the course
of its movement another watch like itself -- the thing is
conceivable; that it
contained within it a mechanism, a system of parts -- a mold, for
instance, or a
complex adjustment of lathes, baffles, and other tools -- evidently
and
separately calculated for this purpose; let us inquire what effect
ought such a
discovery to have upon his former conclusion.
I. The first effect would be to increase his admiration of the
contrivance, and
his conviction of the consummate skill of the contriver. Whether he
regarded the
object of the contrivance, the distinct apparatus, the intricate,
yet in many
parts intelligible mechanism by which it was carried on, he would
perceive in
this new observation nothing but an additional reason for doing what
he had
already done -- for referring the construction of the watch to
design and to
supreme art. If that construction without this property, or, which
is the same
thing, before this property had been noticed, proved intention and
art to have
been employed about it, still more strong would the proof appear
when he came to
the knowledge of this further property, the crown and perfection of
all the
rest.
II. He would reflect, that though the watch before him were, in some
sense, the
maker of the watch, which, was fabricated in the course of its
movements, yet it
was in a very different sense from that in which a carpenter, for
instance, is
the maker of a chair -- the author of its contrivance, the cause of
the relation
of its parts to their use. With respect to these, the first watch
was no cause
at all to the second; in no such sense as this was it the author of
the
constitution and order, either of the arts which the new watch
contained, or of
the parts by the aid and instrumentality of which it was produced.
We might
possibly say, but with great latitude of expression, that a stream
of water
ground corn; but no latitude of expression would allow us to say, no
stretch of
conjecture could lead us to think that the stream of water built the
mill,
though it were too ancient for us to know who the builder was. What
the stream
of water does in the affair is neither more nor less than this: by
the
application of an unintelligent impulse to a mechanism previously
arranged,
arranged independently of it and arranged by intelligence, an effect
is
produced, namely, the corn is ground. But the effect results from
the
arrangement. The force of the stream cannot be said to be the cause
or author of
the effect, still less of the arrangement. Understanding and plan in
the
formation of the mill were not the less necessary for any share
which the water
has in grinding the corn; yet is this share the same as that which
the watch
would have contributed to the production of the new watch, upon the
supposition
assumed in the last section. Therefore,
III. Though it be now no longer probable that the individual watch
which our
observer had found was made immediately by the hand of an artificer,
yet does
not this alteration in anyway affect the inference that an artificer
had been
originally employed and concerned in the production. The argument
from design
remains as it was. Marks of design and contrivance are no more
accounted for now
than they were before. In the same thing, we may ask for the cause
of different
properties. We may ask for the cause of the color of a body, of its
hardness, of
its heat; and these causes may be all different. We are now asking
for the cause
of that subserviency to a use, that relation to an end, which we
have remarked
in the watch before us. No answer is given to this question by
telling us that a
preceding watch produced it. There cannot be design without a
designer;
contrivance without a contriver; order without choice; arrangement
without
anything capable of arranging; subserviency and relation to a
purpose without
that which could intend a purpose; means suitable to an end, and
executing their
office in accomplishing that end, without the end ever having been
contemplated
or the means accommodated to it. Arrangement, disposition of parts,
subserviency
of means to an end, relation of instruments to a use imply the
presence of
intelligence and mind. No one, therefore, can rationally believe
that the
insensible, inanimate watch, from which the watch before us issued,
was the
proper cause of the mechanism we so much admire in it -- could be
truly said to
have constructed the instrument, disposed its parts, assigned their
office,
determined their order, action, and mutual dependency, combined
their several
motions into one result, and that also a result connected with the
utilities of
other beings. All these properties, therefore, are as much
unaccounted for as
they were before.
IV. Nor is anything gained by running the difficulty farther back,
that is, by
supposing the watch before us to have been produced from another
watch, that
from a former, and so on indefinitely. Our going back ever so far
brings us no
nearer to the least degree of satisfaction upon the subject.
Contrivance is
still unaccounted for. We still want a contriver. A designing mind
is neither
supplied by this supposition nor dispensed with. If the difficulty
were
diminished the farther we went back, by going back indefinitely we
might exhaust
it. And this is the only case to which this sort of reasoning
applies. Where
there is a tendency, or, as we increase the number of terms, a
continual
approach toward a limit, there, by supposing the number of terms to
be what is
called infinite, we may conceive the limit to be attained; but where
there is no
such tendency or approach, nothing is effected by lengthening the
series. There
is no difference as to the point in question, whatever there may be
as to many
points, between one series and another -- between a series which is
finite and a
series which is infinite. A chain composed of an infinite number of
links, can
no more support itself, than a chain composed of a finite number of
links. And
of this we are assured, though we never can have tried the
experiment; because,
by increasing the number of links, from ten, for instance, to a
hundred, from a
hundred to a thousand, etc., we make not the smallest approach, we
observe not
the smallest tendency toward self support. There is no difference in
this
respect -- yet there may be a great difference in several respects
-- between a
chain of a greater or less length, between one chain and another,
between one
that is finite and one that is infinite. This very much resembles
the case
before us. The machine which we are inspecting demonstrates, by its
construction, contrivance and design. Contrivance must have had a
contriver,
design a designer, whether the machine immediately proceeded from
another
machine or not. That circumstance alters not the case. That other
machine may,
in like manner, have proceeded from a former machine: nor does that
alter the
case; contrivance must have had a contriver. That former one from
one preceding
it: no alteration still; a contriver is still necessary. No tendency
is
perceived, no approach toward a diminution of this necessity. It is
the same
with any and every succession of these machines -- a succession of
ten, of a
hundred, of a thousand; with one series, as with another -- a series
which is
finite, as with a series which is infinite. In whatever other
respects they may
differ, in this they do not. In all equally, contrivance and design
are
unaccounted for.
The question is not simply, How came the first watch into existence?
which
question, it may be pretended, is done away by supposing the series
of watches
thus produced from one another to have been infinite, and
consequently to have
had no such first for which it was necessary to provide a cause.
This, perhaps,
would have been nearly the state of the question, if nothing had
been before us
but an unorganized, unmechanized substance, without mark or
indication of
contrivance. It might be difficult to show that such substance could
not have
existed from eternity, either in succession -- if it were possible,
which I
think it is not, for unorganized bodies to spring from one another
-- or by
individual perpetuity. But that is not the question now. To suppose
it to be so
is to suppose that it made no difference whether he had found a
watch or a
stone. As it is, the metaphysics of that question have no place;
for, in the
watch which we are examining are seen contrivance, design, an end, a
purpose,
means for the end, adaptation to the purpose. And the question which
irresistibly presses upon our thoughts is, whence this contrivance
and design?
The thing required is the intending mind, the adapting hand, the
intelligence by
which that hand was directed. This question, this demand is not
shaken off by
increasing a number or succession of substances destitute of these
properties;
nor the more, by increasing that number to infinity. If it be said
that, upon
the supposition of one watch being produced from another in the
course of that
other's movements and by means of the mechanism within it, we have a
cause for
the watch in my hand, namely, the watch from which it proceeded; I
deny that for
the design, the contrivance, the suitableness of means to an end,
the adaptation
of instruments to a use, all of which we discover in the watch, we
have any
cause whatever. It is in vain, therefore, to assign a series of such
causes or
to allege that a series may be carried back to infinity; for I do
not admit that
we have yet any cause at all for the phenomena, still less any
series of causes
either finite or infinite. Here is contrivance but no contriver;
proofs of de-
sign, but no designer.
V. Our observer would further also reflect that the maker of the
watch before
him was in truth and reality the maker of every watch produced from
it: there
being no difference, except that the latter manifests a more
exquisite skill,
between the making of another watch with his own hands, by the
mediation of
ffles, lathes, chisels, etc., and the disposing, fixing, and
inserting of these
instruments, or of others equivalent to them, in the body of the
watch already
made, in such a manner as io form a new watch in the course of the
movements
which he had given to the old one. It is only working by one set of
tools
instead of another.
The conclusion which the first examination of the watch, of its
works,
construction, and movement, suggested, was that it must have had,
for cause and
author of that construction, an artificer who understood its
mechanism and
designed its use. This conclusion is invincible. A second
examination presents
us with a new discovery. The watch is found, in the course of its
movement, to
produce another watch similar to itself; and not only so, but we
perceive in it
a system of organization separately calculated for that purpose.
What effect
would this discovery have or ought it to have upon our former
inference? What,
as has already been said, but to increase beyond measure our
admiration of the
skill which had been employed in the formation of such a machine? Or
shall it,
instead of this, all at once turn us round to an opposite
conclusion, namely,
that no art or skill whatever has been concerned in the business,
although all
other evidences of art and skill remain as they were, and this last
and supreme
piece of art be now added to the rest? Can this be maintained
without absurdity?
Yet this is atheism. . . .
CHAPTER FIVE: "APPLICATION OF THE ARGUMENT CONTINUED"
Every observation which was made in our first chapter concerning the
watch may
be repeated with strict propriety concerning the eye, concerning
animals,
concerning plants, concerning, indeed, all the organized parts of
the works of
nature. As,
I. When we are inquiring simply after the existence of an
intelligent Creator,
imperfection, inaccuracy, liability to disorder, occasional
irregularities may
subsist in a considerable degree without inducing any doubt into the
question;
just as a watch may frequently go wrong, seldom perhaps exactly
right, may be
faulty in some parts, defective in some, without the smallest ground
of
suspicion from thence arising that it was not a watch, not made, or
not made for
the purpose ascribed to it. When faults are pointed out, and when a
question is
started concerning the skill of the artist or dexterity with which
the work is
executed, then, indeed, in order to defend these qualities from
accusation, we
must be able either to expose some intractableness and imperfection
in the
materials or point out some invincible difficulty in the execution,
into which
imperfection and difficulty the matter of complaint may be resolved;
or, if we
cannot do this, we must ad- duce such specimens of consummate art
and
contrivance proceeding from the same hand as may convince the
inquirer of the
existence, in the case before him, of impediments like those which
we have
mentioned, although, what from the nature of the case is very likely
to happen,
they be unknown and unperceived by him. This we must do in order to
vindicate
the artist's skill, or at least the perfection of it; as we must
also judge of
his intention and of the provisions employed in fulfilling that
intention, not
from an instance in which they fail but from the great plurality of
instances in
which they succeed. But, after all, these are different questions
from the
question of the artist's existence; or, which is the same, whether
the thing
before us be a work of art or not; and the questions ought always to
be kept
separate in the mind. So likewise it is in the works of nature.
Irregularities
and imperfections are of little or no weight in the consideration
when that
consideration relates simply to the existence of a Creator. When the
argument
respects His attributes, they are of weight; but are then to be
taken in
conjunction-the attention is not to rest upon them, but they are to
be taken in
conjunction with the unexceptionable evidence which we possess of
skill, power,
and benevolence displayed in other instances; which evidences may,
in strength,
number, and variety, be such and may so overpower apparent blemishes
as to
induce us, upon the most reasonable ground, to believe that these
last ought to
be referred to some cause, though we be ignorant of it, other than
defect of
knowledge or of benevolence in the author. . . .
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Promoting an
Understanding of the Intelligent Design of the Universe
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