Darwinism: Science or Philosophy - Chapter 13

A Blindfolded Watchmaker: The Arrival of the Fittest

by David L. Wilcox
1994

Response to this paper.

Author's final comments.


WHY HAS THE NEO-DARWINIAN paradigm become the accepted explanation for the
biological world? This is the issue before this symposium. Has its
endorsement been due to its perceived metaphysical necessity, or is it due
to its success as a scientific explanation of empirical phenomena?
If I am to speak to this issue, I want to make my focus very clear. This
paper concerns the appearance of biological structure, not the tie of such
appearance to biotic descent. Evidence for structural difference/ descent
does not constitute evidence for the mechanism by which structural
transformation took place. Therefore, the sorts of evidence that simply
indicate relationship and/or descent from a common ancestor (e.g.,
molecular clock data, fossil sequences, chromosomal banding, and other
measures of similarity) are not relevant to this question unless they
indicate the nature of the creative mechanism that produced novelty during
that descent. Evidence of ancestry does not imply knowledge of the
morphogenetic mechanisms that are able to produce novelty.

This was perhaps better understood in the nineteenth century than it is
today (Muller and Wagner, 1991). Indeed, by 1850, almost all researchers
accepted common descent (Gillespie, 1979; Desmond, 1989). The unique
implication of Darwin's theory was therefore not descent, but its
suggestion that the source of bionic order was to be found in the natural
(material) order. For the "Naturalist" (Materialist) of Huxley's Young
Guard, natural selection was not simply a theory of mechanism, but a
replacement for the Creator (Desmond, 1989; Moore, 1982).

It still is. From the time Darwin proposed it, the central hope of
neo-Darwinian theory has been its supposed ability to remove the need for
and to take the place of an immaterial designer. According to Stephen
Gould (1982), "Natural Selection is a creator-it builds adaptation step by
step." As G. G. Simpson (1967) put it,

It is already evident that all the objective phenomena of the history of
life can be explained by purely naturalistic, or in the proper meaning
of a much abused word, materialistic factors. They are readily
explicable on the basis of differential reproduction in populations (the
main factor in the modern conception of natural selection) and of the
mainly random interplay of the known processes of heredity . . . Man is
the result of a purposeless and natural process that did not have him in
mind.

Clearly, if the biosphere is self-realizing and Unguided, a designer
without goals, Richard Dawkins was justified in his remark that "Darwin
made it possible to be an intellectually fulfilled atheist " in that
sense, Darwin's "scientific' theory forms a necessary support for the
beliefs of the committed materialist. This does raise an immediate
concern, since it is very difficult for true believers to be objective
about proofs concerning the foundational assumptions of their faith.
But has the Darwinian hope proved justified? Or, have cracks in the
explanatory plaster been papered over (by faith)? My thesis for this paper
is that the plausibility of the neo-Darwinian hypothesis as an explanation
for the appearance of biological novelty depends on an inadequately simple
model of the genome.

The first problem is a matter of simple logic. How can natural selection
be Gould's creator of new morphology when it does not write genetic
messages, but only chooses between them? Rather than a creator, it is a
critic. It brings no information into the genome, but only selects forms
already "created" by the mutated genome. Michelangelo once said he did not
carve an angel, he only released it from the rock. For the artist this was
modesty, but for selection it is simple truth. The "grain" of the wood
being carved, i.e., the informational characteristics of the genome itself
and the probability structure of genetic phase space (Brooks et al., 1989,
define GPS as the probability space of all possible genomes), determine
what selection is able to produce. One cannot select a characteristic not
already present; a horse breeder cannot produce Pegasus.

Clearly, then, the nature of the information encoded on the genome, the
genetic programs that can be mutated, are central to understanding natural
selection's ability to "create." The information structure, however, is
far more complex than has been usually assumed. Specifically, the
information encoded on the genome reveals hierarchy. It is a hierarchy of
described reality, of blueprints for specific cell types, organs,
organisms, hives-blueprints of immense stability. Further, these
blueprints are organized in a form analogous to a linguistic hierarchy, in
which the dehmitions of the "markers" are written in the code they
define-e.g., amino acid code in the encoded description of the structure
of the aminoacyl proteins. Nor are these simple descriptions of
morphology, but a cybernetic hierarchy of controls, with the goals of the
more comprehensive levels buffered by flexibility in the lower levels.
Finally, those goals are realized through a temporal (developmental)
hierarchy, in which the same goal may be achieved by different paths
(Muller and Wagner, 1991). The information that dictates error-checked
homeostatic/homeorhytic phenomena must itself be error-checked and
cybernetic. Clearly, then, there are at least two classes of morphological
information on the genome: adaptive and prescriptive. The implication for
our topic is that the evidence for selective movement in the adaptive
class does not prove that selection can move or formulate prescriptive
information.

The other half of the Darwinian engine is mutation. Since the environment
can select only new variants tossed up by the genome (by mutation,
recombination, etc.), for morphology to be due to selective direction,
mutation would have to produce uniform additive phenotypic variation.
Mutation, however, seems to be an adaptive resource utilized by the
existing hierarchical genome, rather than a simple mechanism to "broaden"
the phenotype. The existing genome is the selective agent. Borstnik et al.
(1987) report that random mutation acts as a search process, and Parsons
(1987, 1988, 1991) indicates that mutational rates increase in stressed
populations. Pakula and Saner (1989) base the evaluation of new mutants on
the function of the original sequence, and Wilkins (1980) states that
mutated genes must be understood within their higher level constraints.
Belyaev (1979) demonstrated that very high levels of genetic variability
are masked in fox populations, and Wilkins (1980) that assorted eye
mutants all affect the size of the entire eye. Turelli (1988) reports that
mutation rates per character are three-or four-fold higher than the rate
per locus.

Clearly then, mutation plays an adaptive role for some genetically
coherent levels (entities). A "new" gene's action is constrained by its
purpose within a more comprehensive biotic entity (its role within a
higher set of rules or blueprint). The existing genome controls the
meaning of new mutants. Thus, it is the "old" genome, rather than the
environment, that is the matrix/source of new morphology. But will that
same process produce those genetic entities? Changes/novelties must make
sense in terms of the complete error-checked genomic system, or the mutant
organism (a genetic trial balloon) will not mature and reproduce. Given a
rabbit in the hat, a magician can pull it out-but how do rabbits get into
the genetic hat? That, too, natural selection must answer if it is to be
the genetic maestro.

Can natural selection provide the constraint for the genome? Models
designed to explain the bases of such constraints have been problematic.
Available genetic diversity is too high to be a constraint. Observed
morphologies have moved as much as ten standard deviations in response to
selection. Stabile environments (niche space), the ability of populations
to track favorable environments, and stabilizing selection all predict low
diversity. As Barton and Turelli (1989) put it, "the central paradox is
that we see abundant polygenic variation, together with stabilizing
selection that is expected to eliminate that variation." Direct
replacement (Lande, 1975; Yoo, 1980) for the mutant alleles must be almost
identical to those lost to selection (Barton and Turelli, 1989). Barton
and Turelli's own stasis theory of pleiotropy predicts only short term
stasis; since the dysfunctional effects are diffuse and randomized, the
genes involved will be subject to slow replacement. Studies (Turelli,
1988; Wilkins, 1980) that show three-to-four fold higher mutation rate per
character than per locus clearly show the constraint of the existing
genomic blueprints. And again, the laboratory/field evidence (Endler,
1986; Boag, 1981) of simple changes in gene frequency due to selection,
drift, etc., are not significant unless they can be shown to be capable of
leading to true novelty, that is, to coherent new morphologies rather than
just to shifts in the diversity pattern of the adaptive genome.

Such a complex genome is unlikely to be changed simply by random mutation.
It is no block of uniform marble to be chipped away by random hammer
blows, but a series of gnarled and knotted instruction sets that must be
courted and wooed if change is to be achieved. This is clearly the meaning
of the evidence given above for the complexity of mutational change. But
mutation is not the only area of investigation that supports a cybernetic
information structure on the genome.

For instance, the nature of species is an open question. The best
definition of species seems to be based on a cohesion model rather than on
reproductive isolation. Paterson (1985) and Templeton (1989) have pointed
out inadequacies in the usual species definitions of reproductive
coherence or isolation. For instance, parthenogenic species may remain
morphologically coherent despite a total lack of interbreeding. Or, in
syngameons, interbreeding species may remain morphologically stabile and
separated despite millions of years of gene flow. Templeton suggests that
species' identity is due to their possession of various genetically based
cohesion mechanisms: thus species are characterized by specific
individuated genetic controls. Burton and Hewitt (1989) Report that such
mechanisms control species boundaries. Further, Vrba's (1984) work with
the alcelaphine tribe of African antelope suggests that the whole tribe
might be viewed as an entity controlled by such a common coherency.
Cybernetic models of coherency are also important in developmental
biology. According to Wagner (1989), "Anatomy emerges at the level of the
organ but not at the level of the parts." He refers to control by such
sets of developmental constraints as "individuation" or entity formation.
The organ is thus ontologically prior to the parts; it defines them and
gives them a local '"purpose" or limited "final cause." Bryant and Simpson
(1984) also speak of "emergence" as a characteristic of a group of cells
committed to form an organ, and error-checked according to norms for that
structure. Thus, an adequate understanding of embryonic tissues involves
their purpose to the forming organ, and implies the existence of a genomic
organ 'blueprint' (Wagner, 1989).

The tension between natural selection and developmental coherency is
evident in two recent papers by Weber (1992) and Wake (1991). Weber states
that ". . . very small regions of morphology (less than 100 cells across)
can respond to selection almost independently ...." Wake states that the
common phenomenon of amphibian homoplasy is due to "limited developmental
and structural options," i.e., to design limitations. The power of
developmental individuations (cybernetic coherencies) is shown in the fact
that existing diversity is utilized to ensure morphological stasis rather
than directional change.

Wagner (1989) also suggests that homology should be centered around shared
entity formation. "Structures from two individuals or from the same
individual are homologous if they share a set of developmental
constraints, caused by locally acting self-regulatory mechanisms of organ
differentiation. These structures are thus developmentally individualized
parts of the phenotype." Such a view of homology would give a meaningful
approach to several ongoing difficulties, including the phylogenetic
reappearance of "lost" structures (e.g.. avian clavicles, Bakker, 1986);
alternate inducers of the same organs (Hall, 1983); alternate paths of
development in related species (Raff and Kaufmann, 1983); the use of same
control genes in different developmental pathways (Marx, 1992) termed
genetic piracy by Roth (1988); iterative homology (parallels in repeated
organs) (Muller and Wagner, 1991), and the growth of "homologous" organs
from different embryonic primordia or germ layers (Wagner, 1989).
Developmental individuation again demonstrates that the GPS is gnarled and
knotted rather than uniform marble. Goodwin concludes that ". . . the
organismic domain as a whole has a 'form' and is therefore, intelligible
(which does not mean predictable) and that the 'content'-the diversity of
living forms, or at least their essential features can be accounted for in
terms of a relatively small number of generative rules or laws" (Webster
and Goodwin, 1982). Such existing blueprints constrain selection into a
few possible paths. Rieppel (1990) agrees that some sort of morphogenetic
"generative principles" dictates the possibilities of biological form.

Such structural rules would restrict living things to parts of GPS that
contain permitted morphologies. As Goodwin (Webster and Goodwin, 1982) put
it, "A 'generative structuralism' is required in order to solve the
problem of the origin of structures." Again, ". . . living organisms are
devices which use the contingent 'noise' of history as a 'motor' to
explore the set of structures, perhaps infinitely large, which are
possible for them." But, how are such curious devices first formed?
Individuations as coherent genetic entities are fundamental biotic
realities. But that raises questions: What is the origin of such sets of
cybernetic constraints/new individuations? How effectively can natural
selection produce or modify such a coherency? Why is it that the evident
structure of Genetic Phase Space is so convoluted? What are the density
and distribution of coherent, viable blueprints in GPS?

Hard questions. Certainly GPS, which is the probability space of all
possible genomes, and thus of all possible genomic coherences, is so large
as to be beyond comprehension, much less prediction. The information
content of GPS is 2n bits where n is the number of bases. The GPS of
genomes of mammalian size (2.5 billion bases) contains around
101,000,000,000 binary bits of information. In contrast, Dawkins's
Biomorph land (Dawkins, 1986) has a probability space of only 1015. What
can we know of GPS? If Dawkins' little predefined universe contains a
mysterious, unpredictable "Holy Grail," surely the probabilities of
outcomes in GPS cannot be known. Nor can we demand that it have some
specific probability structure so that neo-Darwinism will work. Or rather,
we can demand that only if we first assume that neo-Darwinism works, but
that competence is what we are trying to prove, is it not?

If direct knowledge of GPS total structure is impossible, all we have is
inferences concerning its local structure, which can be drawn only from
the pattern of the fossil Record, the record of the search. There is no
other evidence. But the fossil record shows an unevenness of rate
suggesting coherencies, and that evidence throws doubt on the adequacy of
neo-Darwinism as a creative source of new morphology. If it cannot
explain, why is it accepted? I note the following problem areas.

1. Life's origin. The origin of life requires the initial encoding of
specified blueprints, a non-Darwinian process. Specification involves
arbitrary definitions for the "letters" used to write the "messages." How
then did specified complexity (blueprints and their described
products/"machines") arise from any amount of nonspecified complexity
(complex machines, but no blueprints)? Are we really making progress in
explaining the source of the genetic code? "The holy grail is to combine
information content with replication" (Orgel in Amato, 1992). That is, we
need a machine that can write down its own specifications (Thaxton, 1984).
2. Origin of the first animals (Cambrian era). The Cambrian explosion
illustrates the abrupt formulation of body-plan constraints (Erwin, et al.
1987). But how within 25 million years (impalas have remained unchanged
longer than that) could the full complexity of 70plus metazoan phylum
level body-plans arise, and be individuated with error-checking
developmental cybernetic controls from protozoans? Remember that
protozoans do not have encoded genetic information for morphology due to
cellular interaction. How can code that does not yet exist be mutated?
Further, given the appearance of new code, how are phylum level
morphological "norms" generated, capable of holding for the remainder of
the Phanerozoic? As David Jablonski put it, "The most dramatic kinds of
evolutionary novelty, major innovations, are among the least understood
components of the evolutionary process" (Lewin, 1988).

3. Species stasis. Species show morphological stasis in the face of high
levels of selectable diversity (Stanley, 1979 & 1985). But what sort of
genetic anchor can hold constant a species' morphological mean and
variance for several million years (Michaux, 1989), when enough genetic
diversity exists in such species to allow laboratory selection to cause a
ten-fold movement of that morphological mean? Are current models of the
informational organization of the genome adequate to explain this? This
difficulty is reinforced by the still greater morphological stasis shown
by the body-plans of the higher levels of the taxonomic system, a stasis
that seems to shape, direct, and constrain lower level change in an almost
"archetypic" manner. This is hardly the neo-Darwinian prediction.
4. Sudden individuation. New individuation, the appearance of adaptive
complexes (morphological entities) is typically very abrupt-for instance,
limb structure in Diacodexus (Rose, 1982 & 1987) or the Ichthyostegeds
(Coates and Clack, 1991). New "type" forms usually appear suddenly, with
the characteristic morphological systems already "individuated"-as defined
and error checked entities. (Such definition will almost always require
more "bytes' to encode.) Even if possible ancestors that lack the new
complex seem to be present (usually at about the same point in time),
where do the new control system norms come from? The appearance of new
taxa seems to imply the sudden appearance of packages of individuated
structural information, but how does closed, error-checked cybernetic
feedback start? It may be relatively easy to show that a path across
phenotypic space could be progressively adaptive (Kingsolver and Koehl,
1985), but explaining the necessary changes in the underlying genome is a
different matter. The two seem identical only because neo-Darwinism has
assumed the supply of sufficient additive variability.

The origin of individuation is not an easy question (Mller and Wagner,
1991). To make insects from centipedes, three segments must form a new
individuated entity, the thorax. For that to happen, there must be a new
set of constraints encoded on the genome for the thorax, rules that define
the new entity. Such a rule-set requires a lot more information than did
the original repeated structures (segments). The genomic change is far
more complex than the phenotypic change. Wagner (1989) states that we have
no way "to assess the plausibility of the internalization mechanism . . .
the relevant type of data is not thus far available,"

5. Mosaic evolution at morphogenic transitions. Intermediate evidence,
when it does exist, usually is mosaic in nature. Mosaic evolution (the
movement of one character with stasis in another) indicates the
constraints of existing genomic diversity. But, if the characteristic
appearance of new suites of characters is similar to that seen in
Archeopteryx, then an almost completely established (individuated)
character set can be obtained for one organ/structure (flight feathers)
with little movement in others (skeletal characteristics) (Wellnhofer,
1990; Sereno and Chenggang, 1992). This makes sense only if the complexity
to be realized was already available in the genome. If large-scale
morphological change depends on the appearance of a series of new
mutations to be selected by a new adaptive niche, should not characters be
mutated and move together at rates that are at least comparable?

6. Adaptive radiations. The speed, character, and commonness of adaptive
radiations indicate the partitioning and exploration of an occasionally
rich genome. Almost all groups at all taxonomic levels first appear in the
record as "type" forms, and then "explode" into a number of different
lineages with a mosaic of related but not identical potentials for
adaptive morphological change (see #5 and the wealth of information in
Carroll, 1988; MacFadden and Hulbert, 1988; Larson, 1989). This pattern
suggests the partitioning of a very large common genetic package with a
high number of alternate morphological potentials. But no known mechanism
is available for generating such information-dense primordial genomes.
Selection can act only on phenotype, not on hidden genetic potentials. The
idea that a "key" innovation opens a "new" adaptive field assumes what
needs to be proved about the ability of a genome to be reconfigured in
multiple ways. As a matter of fact, a "key" adaptation would be more
likely to produce a plethora of pleiotropic dysfunctions.

7. Parallel development in lineages. In adaptive radiations, the diverging
lineages will frequently develop in a parallel fashion for a number of
characteristics. Such parallels can be quite detailed, suggesting that
distantly related species are relatively close. This implies that
potentials for the parallel developments were already present in the
parental genome as coherent potential blueprints. Thus, "convergent"
evolution frequently looks as if it is due more to shared genomic
constraints than to shared environments. To what extent can "random"
mutations be expected to parallel each other?

So then, we have seen that selection does not "create" anything, but it
must already be there for selection to find, and thus biological novelty
must be generated by the entire genome. Further, we noted that numerous
areas of biological investigation (the nature of mutation, species,
development, and homology) point to a genome constructed as a hierarchy of
cybernetic individuations. Finally, since the GPS is far too large to
predict outcomes, the only way we have to evaluate even its local
structure is the fossil record itself. The best evidence for selection
appears to be the sorting of packages of existing genetic blueprints, not
their creation (or location in GPS). Clearly, the GPS locale being
searched by biotic lineages is extremely complex. But the mechanisms for
the appearance of such novel packages (or the finding of such remote GPS
locations/probabilities) remains mysterious. Thus, natural selection has
not been shown to be an effective creator-substitute. It falls at just the
point where it must succeed.

Of course, it is possible to postulate a structure for GPS that can he
explored by random search processes, a structure that would (if we could
see it) predict the world as it exists. In fact, there is no way to prove
that GPS is not structured in this fashion. No empirical evidence can be
raised against this possibility, because the necessary precursors of the
evidence could be "programmed into" the model of GPS. It seems that a
blind watchmaker properly programmed into GPS is capable of producing
almost anything. But then, such an unknowable watchmaker is not much use
in predicting outcomes, even if he is blind. Sounds rather like the
creationists' problem.

In conclusion, it seems to me that there is indeed good reason to suppose
that metaphysical assumptions have constrained vision in neo-Darwinian
biology. Genomes that contain a high level of encoded morphological
diversity in the form of error-checked coherent entities seem to appear
with regularity. Neo-Darwinism can explain the exploration of such
packages, but it has not proved that it can explain their origin. Based on
uniform human experience, the simplest explanation for the appearance of a
novel, dense pattern of information is an information-dense source. If
available DNA templates seem inadequate, the alternative is a source of
order exterior to the genome. Are there any known material sources of
sufficient density to act as such sources other than human intelligence?
Further, if no adequate material source suggests itself is not the
remaining logical explanation an immaterial source? Such hypotheses are
excluded by the methodological assumptions of science. But-think the
unthinkable-is that an adequate reason to reject the possibility? One
cannot logically exclude a hypothesis of material inadequacy on the basis
of one's a priori assumption of material adequacy.

Neo-Darwinism has been constructed (1) under a metaphysical commitment to
(global) materialism, (2) under the methodological commitment of science
to use strictly material causal explanations, and (3) under the assumption
that good science never lets a problem rest as 'presently unsolved." It
follows that in places where material explanations of cause are thin
(problematic), they should be treated as anomalies waiting for a more
complete (material) explanation rather than as mysteries, or as reasons
for reviewing the adequacy of the methodological assumption. And
certainly, due to the key role played by neo-Darwinism in the apologetic
of metaphysical materialism, thin spots in that theory can be expected to
be frequently overlooked even as scientific problems. When recognized,
such anomalies are still likely to be shelved with the "best" material
explanation attached, not declared unsolved. Indeed, according to Lighuman
and Gingerich (1992), such anomalies will probably not even be recognized
as anomalies until a new paradigm able to explain them is proposed. If the
assumption of global materialism is wrong, that might not happen until
that assumption is rejected as necessary.

All of this may do as a working method for a materialist who has faith in
God's absence. However, it does not justify telling the theist that,
although God may exist (since science cannot prove otherwise), he is
unemployed, since undirected material mechanisms have taken over his job.
Assumed mechanisms are only assumptions, not proofs. (In any case, theists
have never believed that any material event was undirected. How in the
world could anyone demonstrate that any material event was not being
directed?)

Science has proved neither that the material universe is undirected, nor
that our material explanations are adequate. Therefore we should seriously
re-examine the conclusions we have reached while working under the
materialist agenda. Has anyone seen the emperor's new clothes recently?

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