by Antonin Scalia, Amy Gutmann (Editor)



Editorial Reviews

From Library Journal
How should judges interpret statutory and constitutional law? Gutmann
(politics, Princeton; Democracy and Disagreement, LJ 12/15/96) has edited
an admirable work focusing on the relationship of the federal courts in
interpreting the law. Supreme Court Justice Scalia's essay elaborates on
his philosophy of textualism, an approach that eschews legislative
intention in favor of focusing on the original meaning of the text to be
interpreted. He applies this principle to constitutional law, arguing that
we should concentrate on the Constitution's original meaning. Following
this essay are brief comments by noted legal scholars Ronald Dworkin, Mary
Ann Glendon, Lawrence Tribe, and Gordon Wood. It's deceptively easy to
simplify Justice Scalia's ideas to a single sentence, as Gutmann does in
her preface: "laws mean what they actually say, not what legislators
intended them to say but did not write into the law's text." But the
debates over the manner of interpreting legal texts have been held since
the very beginning of our constitutional government. This collection
certainly isn't the final word, but it offers an excellent starting place.
For academic collections.?Jerry E. Stephens, U.S. Court of Appeals Lib.,
Oklahoma City


Product Description:

We are all familiar with the image of the immensely clever judge who
discerns the best rule of common law for the case at hand. According to
U.S. Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia, a judge like this can maneuver
through earlier cases to achieve the desired aim--"distinguishing one
prior case on his left, straight-arming another one on his right,
high-stepping away from another precedent about to tackle him from the
rear, until (bravo!) he reaches the goal--good law." But is this
common-law mindset, which is appropriate in its place, suitable also in
statutory and constitutional interpretation? In a witty and trenchant
essay, Justice Scalia answers this question with a resounding negative.
In exploring the neglected art of statutory interpretation, Scalia urges
that judges resist the temptation to use legislative intention and
legislative history. In his view, it is incompatible with democratic
government to allow the meaning of a statute to be determined by what the
judges think the lawgivers meant rather than by what the legislature
actually promulgated. Eschewing the judicial lawmaking that is the essence
of common law, judges should interpret statutes and regulations by
focusing on the text itself. Scalia then extends this principle to
constitutional law. He proposes that we abandon the notion of an
everchanging Constitution and pay attention to the Constitution's original
meaning. Although not subscribing to the "strict constructionism" that
would prevent applying the Constitution to modern circumstances, Scalia
emphatically rejects the idea that judges can properly "smuggle" in new
rights or deny old rights by using the Due Process Clause, for instance.
In fact, such judicial discretion might lead to the destruction of the
Bill of Rights if a majority of the judges ever wished to reach that most
undesirable of goals.

This essay is followed by four commentaries by Professors Gordon Wood,
Laurence Tribe, Mary Ann Glendon, and Ronald Dworkin, who engage Justice
Scalia's ideas about judicial interpretation from varying standpoints.

Product Details

Paperback: 176 pages
Publisher: Princeton University Press (July 27, 1998)
ISBN: 0691004005